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Abstract: After the collapse of  the Soviet state, during the last decades of  the
21st century, Russia found itself  in the system crisis in cataclysmic measures that
threatened to disintegrate this once powerful state. Political and economic power
was significantly displaced outside the institutions of  the system in the hands of
oligarchs and regional governors, which threaten to disintegrate the federal system
and problems in the economic, social, demographic and military sphere shook
the foundations of  the Russian state. On the international stage, Russia’s influence
was marginalized. All the elements of  its hard and soft power were reduced.
Russia has lost the attributes of  a superpower and the leader of  the former
socialist camp was reduced to the level of  a regional power. With the arrival of
Vladimir Putin as the President of  the RF in 2000 began a new phase in the
development of  post-Soviet Russia. Initiated extensive internal political, economic
and social reforms, as well as changes in foreign and security policy, resulted in a
gradual recovery and consolidation of  the Russian state and society. An essential
feature of  political life in Russia is the personalization of  the power and the
institution of  the President of  the RF, which largely depends on the personality
of  the president and his inner circle. This distinction is rooted in the political
tradition and culture, and the imperial legacy. Some Western authors state that
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the tradition of  the autocratic rule is in the heart of  Russian political culture,
while Russian authors believe that a strong central government, embodied in the
institution of  the head of  state in modern Russia is a necessity in the initial phase
of  democratization and social transition. From the beginning, Putin has sought
to pour “people from their inner circle” “into all levels of  government and
spheres that generate social and political power.” This profiled the structure of
Putin’s regime, which is a very active process of  permanent change of  position,
role and importance of  individual personalities, as well as their “migration” from
one sphere of  government to another. In the process, the overall fluctuations of
high-ranking politicians, divided into clans and influential groups (the so-called
siloviki, technocrats and liberals), Putin is the “headquarters” of  the entire regime.
Estimates of  the regime of  Russian President V. Putin, his personality, as well as
a trail that is left in modern history, are more polarized and controversial than
estimates of  many other figures of  Russia, and even global politics. However,
the importance that Putin has for Russia and its position and role in the XXI
century is undeniable, as well as his controversial planetary authority, or his global
popularity. Putin is one of  the most influential politicians in the world and  the
authors’ opinions of  him are so divided, conflicting, contradictory and
“ideologically colored” that any attempt of  his generalization represents an
endeavor foredoomed to failure. The amplitude of  reactions is ranging from awe
and glorification, to protest and scorn. It is undisputed that he is a charismatic,
pragmatic and capable statesman. It is also an indisputable fact that the
implementation of  his policy has the outright support of  the Russian people.
Critics of  Putin’s regime as its main characteristic state the rigidity of  the
government, inflexibility, lack of  transparency, bureaucratic domination of
political and economic elites, instability in the sense of  being based on the
personality of  the President and not on the balance of  institutions.
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INTRODUCTION 
During the last decade of  the twentieth century, after the collapse of  the Soviet
state, Russia found itself  in the system crisis of  cataclysmic proportions that shook
all aspects of  political and social life and threatened the complete disintegration
of  the once powerful state. Political and economic power is largely relocated
outside the institutions of  the system and is increasingly concentrated in the hands
of  big businessmen (oligarchs) and regional political elites (governor), which
threaten to seriously undermine the federal structure and integrity of  the country
(Knežević, 2009). The military power of  the country has been severely weakened.
The problems in the social sphere and the decline in the living standard of  the
population below the lower acceptable limit shook the foundations of  the Russian
state. This is a dramatic effect on the demographic situation, which exceeded all
comparative examples in Russian history (Solženicin, 1997). On the international
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stage, Russia’s influence was marginalized. All the elements of  its hard and soft
power have been drastically reduced. Russia has lost its superpower attributes and
the once powerful state and the leader of  the socialist political and ideological
groups of  countries in the bipolar period, according to the opinion of  a significant
number of  authors, was reduced to the status of  a regional power. Such an
unsound state of  the country with a proud history, which existed in the early years
of  post-Cold War “Yeltsin” era, was in sharp contrast to its glorious imperial
periods of  the past in which the Russian state had a leading role in terms of
military power and political, cultural and civilization impacts. In Russia, this created
a deep sense of  disappointment and humiliation.4
Personnel changes in the state management, the appointment of  Vladimir
Vladimirovich Putin as acting President of  the Russian Federation from 31
December 1999 and his subsequent victory in the presidential elections in the spring
of  2000, created the preconditions for the start of  a new phase in the development
of  post-Soviet Russia. During the first presidential term of  V. Putin were initiated
and launched extensive internal political, economic and social reforms, as well as
changes in foreign and security policy, which resulted in a gradual recovery,
stabilization and consolidation of  the Russian state and society.5 In order to
consolidate economic opportunities and eliminate anomalies and negative trends in
the economy, as well as the negative consequences of  privatizations, Putin’s regime
began the process of  very complex and long-term measures aimed to de-
monopolization of  other competing power centers - the economic elite, or oligarchs.
Apart from the fact that the disturbances in the Russian economy were largely the
result of  the so-called “vaucher privatization”,6 many of  whom had a criminal and
4 “Humiliation of  a big country, if  at the same time does not weaken, always is a dangerous game.
Russia has decided not to allow ever again to be surprised“... (Kisindžer, 2008, p. 162.).
5 Putin’s regime by internal reforms made by the centralization of  power and monopolisation of
political power through complex processes of  elimination of  negative trends in the state and
society. The priority objective was to crackdown on non-institutional sources of  political and
economic power and positioning of  the regime as an independent center within the state
administration. For details about these processes in the analysis of  the political system of  post-
Soviet Russia among others papers in papers of  Richard Sakwa…(R. Sakwa, Putin - Russia’s choice,
Routledge, New York 2008.; R. Sakwa, Russian Policy and Society, Routledge, London 2008.);
6 The first wave of  privatization of  the Russian oil industry in the nineties of  the last century, was
completed in 1997, resulted in the fact that the state has privatized half  of  its production and
distribution capacity. From 2000 to 2003, began the second wave of  privatization of  the Russian oil
sector, which is a quantitative relationship changed ownership in favor of  the corporate capital in
relation to the state (four private companies, “TNK-BP”, “YUKOS”, “Lukoil” and “Surgutnjeftgaz”
have become the owners of  the best resource base - deposits of  energy and were in control of  the
best production and transport capacities of  the Russian oil industry). During this, in 2003, this
tendency has reached its peak, after which measures the current government began the process of
restoring state control over this strategic industry sectors ... (Milosavljević, 2014, p. 113.);
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“predatory” character, originated from collusion between organized crime and some
political structures of  state power, the reforms of  Putin’s regime, which was
characterized by extreme complexity, was not possible to implement. The pre-
established effective mechanisms of  state control in strategic industries (primarily in
energy - oil and gas industry and the sector of  non-ferrous and precious metals,
therefore precisely the most profitable areas of  the Russian economy, where is found
the largest number of  financial empires of  the oligarchs),  at the same time did not
abolish the parallel, competitive and the largely autonomous centers of  political
power, constituted by regional leaders (governors) and/or groups of  oligarchs. 
With deft political moves, directed at the oligarchic structure,7 the central
government has succeeded in a relatively short period of  time to regain control
over strategic natural resources, through the processes of  their nationalization, or
through the processes of  establishing “control” and the influence of  the “loyal
oligarchs”,8 which contributed not only to the consolidation of  the economic
situation in the country, but also had a stabilizing effect in the political and social
spheres. The end result of  the struggle of  state structures to neutralize the economic
and political power of  individual oligarchs, and their “disempowerment” at the end
of  the first half  of  the first decade of  this century, was the return of  state control
over the strategic sectors of  the economy, with the re-nationalization of  huge
natural resources,9 primarily in the field of  energy, as the most profitable segment
7 In July 2000, after the arrest of  one of  the most influential oligarchs Vladimir Gusinsky, the owner
of  the holding company “Media Most”, a meeting was held with 28 Putin’s oligarchs, where they
established a new “game rules”. Oligarchs was told that they must “refrain” from their political
ambitions, it must continue to carry out their regular tax liability, and that they must give up part
of  their wealth in the interests of  society... (M. I. Goldman, „Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New
Russia, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 102.); Mikhail Khodorkovsky, owner of  oil
corporation “YUKOS” and one of  the most powerful oligarch at the time, was arrested in October
2003 on charges of  tax evasion, a campaign “Yukos” in 2004 bought the state company “Rosneft”
(dropped from the original intentions that the control package “Yukos” take over “Gazprom”
because of  the ownership structure and influence of  foreign capital in “Gazprom”... (Konofczuk,
2006, p. 33), (http:/www.osw.waw.pl/files/ PRACE_25.pdf., 16.11.2011.); Time has begun the
process of  achieving primacy of  the state in the ownership structure of  the Russian oil sector,
across national energy giants “Rosneft” and “Gazprom”... (O nationalization of  Russian oil sector
in the works of  Russian author Pappe Yakov (Паппэ Яаков), More, „How Russia is Nationalized:
The Oil Sector“, Kommersant, 19.09.2007.);
8 An example of  the “loyal” oligarchs, for example, represents a Roman Abramovich who has sold
part of  its country “property” (package of  shares “Rosneft”, a part of  the shares in the “RusAl”
-ui “Aeroflot”, as the action of  certain media outlets) he owned... (More: Milinčić, 2007.);
9 The re-establishment of  state control over the energy sector, the strategy of  the existence of  two
giant energy companies with majority state capital ( “Gazprom” and “Rosneft”), had direct
implications for the international position of  the Russian state, in terms of  strengthening its role
and importance in international economic – energy relations, but also in the context of  strengthening
Russian positions in the global political and s security sphere... (Milosavljević, 2014, p. 114.)
of  the Russian economy. Strong condemn of  these actions of  the Russian state
leadership are mostly coming from the West and are essentially focused on criticism
of  creating a monopolistic position of  the state in the Russian oil and gas sector,
as well as the violation of  economic rights of  foreign companies in Russia. Some
authors called this measure of  Putin’s regime the “state expropriation” of  the
Russian energy sector, “economic imperialism” (Goldman, 2008, p. p. 322-329)
and like, trying to portray Russia as an unreliable partner in the energy sector –
which is one of  the main pillars of  power of  the Russian state (Primakov, 2010, p.
93).10 In addition to these processes, measures of  Putin’s domestic reforms, in his
words, were aimed, inter alia, to crack down organized crime, fight against
corruption, to raising the living standard of  Russian citizens, reduction of  poverty
and unemployment, preventing the continuation of  negative trends in the
demographic sphere, etc (Путин, 2010).
VLADIMIR PUTIN – A LEADER THAT MARKED
THE BEGINNING OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM
One of  the essential characteristics that determine political life of  modern
Russia is the personalization of  power and the institution of  the President of
the Russian Federation, which largely depends on the personality of  the president
and his inner circle. A political scientist and professor at the Moscow State
Institute of  International Relations (MGIMO - University) MID RF, Elena
Ponomareva argues that “in contemporary Russia national-historical situation
determines leadership for centuries beyond (...) Sacralization of  state power in
Russia is deeply rooted in tradition and political culture. More than that, in Russia,
as in historical retrospect, so today, the leader perceived as a symbol of  national
unity, as a form of  collective consciousness and behavior” (Пономарева, 2006,
p. 167-168). This definition of  the leadership of  E. Ponomareva belongs to the
conceptual and the best terminological qualification of  one of  the essential
characteristics of  the political system of  modern Russia. This feature has its roots
in the Russian specificity, or the political tradition and imperial heritage. Russian
historical experience shows that the personality of  the Russian monarchs has
always symbolized strength and unity of  the Russian empire and reflected the
connection between the national identity of  the Russian people and the country.
In other words, in the essence of  the Russian tradition is that Russian people
follow and support a successful and charismatic leader. According to the opinion
of  some Western authors, the tradition of  autocratic rule is at the core of  the
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10 At the same time, some authors have pointed out the fact that foreign corporations, despite the
“discriminatory conditions”, frantically tried to keep their participation in projects in Russia’s oil
and gas industry, motivated by the possibility of  gaining huge profits... (Štavljanin, 2009, p. 67)
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Russian political culture, which rejects individualism and highlights paternalism,
the cult of  leaders and mysticism, rationalism and pragmatism instead
(Godzimirski, 2008). A large number of  Russian author is of  the opinion that a
strong central government in Russia, embodied in the institution of  the head of
state, is a necessity and a need, taking into account its specific historical
experience, an imperial tradition, as well as “special psychology of  the Russian
people,” but both quantitative and qualitative characteristics of  the territorial and
demographic factors, with the caveat that this attitude only applies to the initial
phase of  democratization and transition of  society, and consolidation of  political
and economic opportunity (Primakov, 2003, p. 88).
Simultaneously with these processes of  struggle with competing centers of
power, Putin has sought “people from their inner circle” to pour “into all spheres
and levels of  government that generate social and political power,” whether it is
the highest state functions (high state bureaucracy) or strategic state, mixed or
corporate businesses. In this way, the structure of  the Putin regime is very quickly
profiled, which is a very active process of  the permanent change of  the position,
role and importance of  individual personalities, as well as their “migration” from
one sphere of  government to another. In this entire process of  fluctuations and
“modeling” of  elite groups and clans, Putin is the “center of  gravity and Staff ”
of  the entire regime and the main arbiter in the struggle of  various influential
groups (Vinogradov, 2010). Some Russian authors believe that with the re-election
of  Vladimir Putin as president of  Russia in March 2012, the Kremlin once again
became the center of  the main political decision-making and that Putin, while
retaining the status of  the “dominant player” remains a “supreme arbiter” who
actually “makes key decisions” (Ria Novosti, 2012b).
One of  the most influential group is called siloviki, which originated from
representatives of  institutions of  force and security services, as well as Putin
himself  (Igor Sechin, Nikolay Patrushev, Viktor Ivanov, Anatoly Serdyukov, Viktor
Zubak, etc.) (Bremmer, I., Sharp, S. B. (2006/07). However, the “specific weight”
and the real power of  the former “superinfluece heavyweights” from the ministries
of  force at the end of  the first decade of  this century, has dropped sharply. The
same is the case with the decline in the influence of  certain oligarchs such as
Roman Abramovich and Oleg Deripaska, who at the end of  the first decade of
XXI century, mostly focused on their own business and finding opportunities for
the “survival” of  their financial empires in the global economic crisis (Milosavljevi’,
2014, p. 95). No less power is concentrated in the hands of  another Putin’s closest
associates called “technocrats”, who occupied leading positions in the largest state-
owned companies, especially in the energy sector (Alexey Miller, Sergey Chemezov,
etc.), or so-called “liberals” (German Gref, Sergey Ignatieff, et al.). Apart from the
influence of  those groups concentrated in various structures of  power, it should
inevitably be noted that in recent years in Russia certain authors have a great
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influence - scientists and experts. That is not a compact group, on the contrary, it
is very polarized. The spectrum of  their activities and preferences is ranging from
unconditional support to the current government to the opposition to the action,
even radical criticism of  the government (Vinogradov, 2012, p. 54-55). A group
of  experts “close to the authorities” - the so-called loyal experts actively participate
in the development and popularization of  the authorities.11 The second group of
authors - experts are those with a “neutral” status and position in relation to the
regime,12 while the third group of  experts is not in favor of  the current regime,
some of  them even act in opposition movements.13 Their activity is characterized
by fierce criticism and condemnation of  the current government. On the basis
of  these opinions and the presented facts, we can conclude that regardless of  the
contradictions between the various interest groups and camps within the
government in the near future it should not be expected a major division within
these structures. In hypothetical terms, the division is possible in the case of  a
worse economic situation, decrease of  trust and public support to the actual Putin’s
regime, or in the case of  opposition consolidation and significant increase of  its
popularity, which is not a realistic option at this moment or in the near future.
REVIEWS AND CRITICS OF PUTIN’S REGIME
Estimates of  the regime of  Russian President Vladimir Putin, his personality
and former political activity, and the mark he left in modern history (though this
process is not completed, as he is currently in his new presidential term (2012-
18.)), are more polarized and controversial than of  any other figure of  Russian
and even global politics. However, the significance which Vladimir Putin has for
Russia and his position and role in the XXI century is undeniable, as well as his
controversial planetary authority, or his global popularity. Russian author Fyodor
Lukyanov believes that the President of  Russia V. Putin is one of  the most
influential politicians in the world, but opinions about him are contradictory,
controversial and intense, that is, “ones praise him, others demonize”.14
11 The group of  experts “close to the authorities” are commonly classified Alexei Arbatov, Sergey
Markov, Gleb Pavlovski, Valery Fyodorov, Vitaly Ivanov, Andranik Migranjan, Dmitry Orlov,
Alexey Cesnakova etc.
12 The group of  authors from “neutral” status in relation to power belong Karganov S., F. Lukyanov,
D. Trenin, N. Petrov, J. Minchenko, D. Badovskiy, I. Bunin, D. Oreshkin, A. Ryabov, etc.
13 In this group are among the most common Lila Shevtsova, Miov Vladimir, Vladimir
Pribilovskiy, Mikhail Delyagin, Andrey Piontkovsky, Mark Urnov, etc.
14 In the opinion of  a number of  authors in the world perceive Putin as a separate phenomenon. “It
just turned out that Putin is the embodiment of  the state of  the world, this smutne transitional
situation in which the entire international system and all States of  which the system is assembled.
He is the symbol of  this situation, only the one positive and the other negative”... (Lukjanov, 2012);
A large number of  authors, both those who support the policy of  Vladimir
Putin, and those who criticize, challenge and accuse him of  autocracy, agree in
their assessment that he is a charismatic, pragmatic and capable personality. The
amplitude of  the reaction ranges from glorification and admiration to protest
and scorn of  the results of  Putin’s policies. Any attempt of  generalization
represents an endeavor foredoomed to failure. Instead of  this approach, it is
necessary to identify and carry out an analysis of  existing positions and on this
basis, if  possible, to try to make the appropriate conclusions.
A number of  Russian and domestic authors have a positive attitude towards
Putin’s project of  political consolidation and economic stabilization of  the
situation in post-Soviet Russia. Despite the existing shortcomings and criticisms,
they argue that “Russia is consolidated when a charismatic leader came to power“,
that “Putin’s regime represented a response to the historical necessity” (Medvedev,
2007) and that the “freedom that Putin’s regime got sometimes standing outside
the constitutionality and public accountability enable greater efficiency in the
implementation of  reforms” (Milosevi’, 2006). Some Russian authors state that
“what is now a world scale referred to as “Putinism”, is the result of  the specific
needs of  political and intellectual climate that grew out of  a specific historical
experience of  Russia” (Мигранян, 2004), and that “Vladimir Putin certainly has
massive popular support for his political course (Пономаревa, 2006), which
represents the “center line of  the ideological spectrum” (Кортунов, 2011). Also,
a number of  Russian authors, with an unconcealed bias for Putin, argues that as
a leader who “restored Russia”, he often draws visionary statesman moves,   has
“broad aspects of ” sense of  time in which he lives and the position in which he
found the Russian state after the turbulent nineties of  the last century. 
A number of  Russian authors are of  the view that the Putin era has enabled
the country to consolidate internally and to a gradual return to the role of  an
unavoidable actor on the international scene. These authors for Vladimir
Vladimirovich state that he is the man who went to “historical role to take off
the Yeltsin mortgage from the Russian shoulders,” the statesman with an
incredible ability of  a “superior juggler”, ready to take the burden of  difficult
decisions by “balancing as a player on the wire”, who does not hide behind
generalized rhetorical phrases as a fogging substance. Based on the views of  these
authors, it can be concluded that the determination of  Putin’s administration for
a strong and powerful Russia represents a milestone which holds all the relevant
factors of  the Russian state policy for over a decade. And some authors from
the West, with a dose of  criticism, show a positive attitude towards individual
elements of  Putin’s project of  consolidation and stabilization of  post-Soviet
Russia. These authors argue that “Putin’s historic mission is nothing more than
consolidation and legalization of  social revolution from the Gorbachev-Yeltsin
era, and to erase defects of  Yeltsin’s rule” (Sakwa, 2008, p. 309), that “only semi-
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authoritarian rule like Putin’s Russia can keep on the right track” (Lieven, 2005),
that “Putin has built legitimacy for criticism of  Yeltsin’s pro-Western policies,
responsible for causing chaos and destruction” (Weiss, 2008), and the like. 
Harsh criticism of  Putin’s regime and the “Russian own path of
development,” both from the West and from Russia itself, are mainly focused on
the “authoritarian - bureaucratic nature of  government,” and the fact that “the
regime in the Russian Federation, both in the initial stages of  stabilization of  the
political, economic, social, demographic, security and other conditions, as well
as later works often stand outside the boundaries of  constitutionality, legality,
public accountability and democratic principles” (Godzimirski, 2008). In attempts
of  qualifications of  Putin’s regime, that the Russian political system is
characterized by heterogeneity of  attitudes, the authors use different terms and
phrases, such as “managed democracy”, “sovereign democracy” (key elements
of  the concept of  “sovereign democracy” organized by the Russian Society of
the centralization of  power and political integrity, idealization of  the goals and
personalization of  political institutions) (Сурков, 2007), while at the other end
of  the spectrum is an evaluation and qualification such as “over-managed
democracy” (Petrov, 2010), “reactionary modernization” (Морозов, 2006),
“semi- authoritarian” or “authoritarian” system. Some Russian authors qualify
Putin’s regime with the phrase “over-managed democracy”, defining it as “a
complex system that allows the elimination of  a public authority control, avoiding
public accountability and preserve the semblance of  respect for democratic
procedures”, and as its essential elements cited a strong presidential system of
governance (the expense of  all other institutions and actors), state control of  the
media and control of  electoral processes (Petrov, 2010, p. 43-44). As an illustration
of  the above criticism, interesting are sharp qualifications of  Putin’s regime by
the Russian author Latisha Shevtsova, standing on the part of  the opposition
pluralist ideological spectrum of  Russian political scene, who stated that “Putin’s
regime, the semi-democratic regime in a uniform and democratic institutions
(parliament, political parties, trade unions, youth movements) are a “Potemkin
village” masquerade organized by the Russian elite for centuries, in order to hide
a system that is both authoritarian, oligarchic and bureaucratic to the point of
paralysis” (Shevtsova, 2003).
In general, critics of  the Putin regime as its main characteristics cites
inflexibility, lack of  transparency, bureaucratic, restrictive government, the
dominance of  special interests and the political and economic elites. At the same
time, as an essential feature of  the Russian political regime refers to his personal
character (with the weakness of  other institutions), and its foundation in the
person of  the President and not in the balance of  the institutions, which makes
it unstable. Due to this attitude of  the personal nature of  the Russian political
system, a large number of  authors state that the political popularity and extremely
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high rating of  V. Putin (the “United Russia”, as the dominant party) is of  vital
importance to the pillar on which rests the whole political system (or, as some
argue, “the hook on which to hold”), as well as the preservation of  a high level
of  Putin’s popularity is an imperative for the overall political and economic elite
in power, due to the fact that “there’s nothing he could have replaced the lack of
trust in leaders”.15
The largest number of  arguments for their criticism of  Putin’s regime, these
authors “found” in the “fact” that the nature of  Putin’s authoritarian regime is
“semi-authoritarian”; that Russia expressed processes to prevent the opposition
movement, even with the elimination of  political opponents;16 that there are
ubiquitous violations of  political rights and freedoms; that regime is eroding the
role and importance of  the political institutions; that the system is making crucial
decisions extremely centralized, concentrated in the hands of  the president and
the prime minister and largely determined by the balance of  power of  influential
political groups; and that there is suppression of  freedom of  the media, while
creating a state monopoly in this sphere. These authors also point out the
ubiquitous reduce of  the rights of  ethnic communities through a process of
centralization of  power, then a violation of  eco-heavy corporate rights and
freedoms, especially in Russian strategic industries at the expense of  strengthening
the role of  the state (Goldman, 2008, p. 132-134), “suppression and persecution”
in the sphere of  NGOs, and similar. Even if  you reject the good part of  the
“extremely negative” criticism of  Putin’s regime, often expressed with concealed
malice and contempt, generally speaking, it is difficult to escape the impression
that a large number of  such assessment are formed under the strong influence
of  Western stereotypes and arrogant tendencies to share the lessons of
Democracy and human rights.
As for the score (and criticism), these critical authors (who are mostly from
the West) believe that the personality of  Russian President Vladimir Putin is of
a vigorous and decisive leader, who is also “the visionary and political
manipulator”, that Putin’s decisions are often a “joint strategic analysis and
instinctive reactions.” In their view, a vision is often demonstrated, combined
15 Indicative is the thesis of  some Russian authors, that the popularity of  Dmitry Medvedev
(President of  RF 2008-12, now prime minister), although extremely high, and for only a few
percent lower than Putin, essentially represents only a projection of  Putin’s rating and popularity,
and that is actually the word the popularity of  a leader.
16 In addition to the earlier accusations of  official Moscow for the political persecution of  political
opponents and Russian oligarchs (Berezovsky, Gusinsky, Khodorkovsky and others.) That came
from the West, the death of  the Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya in 2006, and former
Federal Security Service officer Alexander Litvinenko RF from by certain Western circles qualified
as “regime’s murder”, for which he was accused by Moscow. These events have had a negative
impact on relations between Russia and the West ... (See more: Lukyanov, , 2009, p. 122.);
with ruthlessness to the “internal” opponents who, in his opinion, represent an
obstacle in the way of  Russia to re-attribute acquiring large countries. In this opus
can be singled out “attitudes according to which V. Putin’s personality possesses
the character and skill of  a dictator, and his own characteristics are used for the
development of  democratic institutions and the way of  the Russian state to the
redefinition of  the geopolitical code and its own identity. On this path, “Putin’s
guiding star has been and remains Russia’s national interest”, viewed through the
prism of  realpolitik. Some critics from the West even went as far as to accuse V.
Putin that in certain periods his government bought the popularity by using his
“macho image,” to show the hustle and determination, and at the same time
presented himself  as a man of  the people. In response to these and similar
attitudes and accusations, the Russian authors who fully support Putin’s concept
of  development of  Russian society and the state, counter-argument that Russia
is a huge country with all its specificities and that such operation of  regime is a
necessity in certain situations because it allows a greater efficiency of  the state in
protecting national interests. Putin pointed out that “as a realist and a
conservative”, he quite soberly observed all the complexities of  the current events
in the country and on the international scene, but also that “all the more difficult
are the answers to the increasing number of  challenges” (Lukjanov, 2012).
Summing up, the views of  a significant number of  Western and Russian
authors of  Putin’s great popularity and the conclusion are that his success lies in
the ability to align the policies with the issues on which there is a broad national
consensus in Russia. Topping the list is certainly the idea of  a powerful Russian
state - great power, economically strong, with respectable armed forces to
safeguard a vast expanse of  Russia. One of  the priorities is the equitable
distribution of  income, or the use of  large export revenues resource potential
(primarily energy) to improve the living standard and social status of  Russian
citizens. State control over natural resources, support to reforms and private
enterprise, the modernization of  the Russian economy, strengthening the
international position of  Russia as a great state, are key imperatives of  the political
course of  Putin’s regime. Also, in the opinion of  many authors, one of  the most
term comparative advantages of  Putin’s regime is the fact that Putin and the
Russian state leadership fundamentally understand all the complexities of  Russian
historical experience and advantages of  inheritance Russian traditions and its
peculiarities. Accordingly, proclaiming the diversity of  Russia to the West and its
particular civilization lines, the inspiration for his political pragmatism sought
precisely in the Russian past, and at the same time “sophisticated” acceptance
and implementation of  those solutions and western values, which can be in
Russian social and political discourse. Vladimir Putin’s personal popularity and
support that his political concept have among Russian citizens is perhaps best
illustrated by the attitude of  the Russian author Leonid Polyakova, who believes
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that Putin is the leader of  custom civilization specificities of  Russia, that he will
remain the president of  Russia until 2018 and that in the future no one will be
able to “move” him unless he himself  wants to leave.17
In recent years a number of  sociological research has been carried out in
Russia on Putin’s support to the government and public opinion about the basic
directions of  its policies. The results of  these studies showed that the level of
trust of  citizens and public support for the current Russian president and his
political concept is stable and ranges between one-half  and two-thirds. As the
argument of  this attitude can serve a large number of  results of  sociological
research relating to citizens’ assessment of  the political course of  Putin’s
government. Another relevant indicator is the results of  the presidential elections
of  2012 in which the V. Putin convincingly won. Namely, in the presidential
elections (according to the official results of  the Central Election Commission
RF) in the first round 04 March 2012, voted 65.3% of  registered voters.18 Vladimir
V. Putin (candidate - United Russia / All-Russia People’s Front), won nearly two-
thirds of  the votes (63.7% or 45,602,075 votes), defeating in the first round all
other challengers,19 thus becoming the new/old president of  RF for the next six
years (2012-18.). In the last decade, presidential election results in Russia largely
coincide with the results of  the parliamentary elections and the success of  the
party “United Russia”, which is profiled as a party of  government and which is
essentially led by V. Putin, although an increasing number of  politicians alternated
as a president of  the party. Based on the analysis of  the presidential election
results (and parliamentary) in Russia in the past decade, it can be concluded that
the support of  Putin’s political concept is stable and that it is at the level of  60-
70%, while his political party United Russia has support from 50 and 60% of
the electorate.
17 “Russia is a unique cultural and historical phenomenon, which is characterized by many specific
details of  its history and tradition. Tom unity of  opposites in the new millennium do not need
a dictator, but a political leader who is able to play the role of  mediator to act as a mediator in
whom they trust all the opposing parties and has the ability to transform the energy of  conflict
dynamics of  development of  the country. Russia has received just such a leader who fits its
civilizational specificities - V. Putin”... (Poljakov,.2012.); 
18 Результаты выборов, Центральная избирательная комиссиия Российской Федерации
(ЦИК), http://www.cikrf.ru/ banners/prezident_2012/index.html, 03.12.2012.; 
19 KPRF candidate Gennady Zyuganov, won 17.19% or 12,318,353 votes; Mikhail Prokhorov, as
an independent candidate, 07.88% (5,722,508); LDPR candidate Vladimir Zhirinovsky 06.23%
(4,458,103); Sergey Mironov (A Just Russia) 03,85% (2,763,935)... (Протокол Центральной
избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации о результатах выборов Президента Российской Федерации
4 марта 2012 года, („Сводная таблица Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской
Федерации о результатах выборов Президента Российской Федерации 4 марта 2012 года,
лист № 11,“ http://www.cikrf.ru/banners/prezident_2012/itogi/result.html, 02.12.2012.).
The results of  sociological surveys precisely confirm the facts presented to
support the allegation that most citizens of  Russia positively assesses the activity
of  V. Putin as the president of  the country and  expect  Russia to continue on
the previous political course. The research results show that in comparing the
results of  Putin’s era with Gorbachev’s epoch “perestroika” and the Yeltsin era
(the period before “Soviet” and “Yeltsin” past), reviews of  the achievements of
Putin’s are much more positive, with the main highlight on the successes of  the
internal stability, international authority and strengthen of  the basic institutions
on which the state rests. The areas in which Putin as president had the most
success, according to the survey results, are the international relations and
increasing living standard. The research results testify that the majority of  Russian
citizens believe that Putin’s regime successfully solved the fundamental issues of
economic and national security. Based on the results, the conclusion is that the
fundamental citizens’ expectations are the development of  the economic and
social dimensions of  Russian society, and that the main tasks of  the current Putin
regime are economic growth and social development of  the Russian state (which
must be based on the results achieved in the previous decade, and not as in the
previous period related to survival). The conclusion is that Putin is the first
Russian leader in the last quarter of  the century, whose activity at the highest
state functions the majority of  respondents assessed positively. 
INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION
Unsound state of  the country with a proud history, which existed in the first
years of  the post-Cold War “Yeltsin” era, has sparked a deep sense of
disappointment and humiliation. That is why Russia “decided” never to allow to
be brought to a similar position again. During the first presidential term, V. Putin
initiated extensive internal political, economic and social reforms, as well as
changes in foreign and security policy, which has resulted in the gradual recovery
and consolidation of  the Russian state. One of  the essential characteristics of
the political system of  modern Russia is the personalization of  power. The
institution of  the President of  RF is largely dependent on the personality of  the
president and his inner circle. These qualities have roots in the Russian political
tradition and imperial heritage. Russian historical experience shows that Russian
people follow and support a successful and charismatic leader. Some authors
point out that a strong central authority embodied in the institution of  the head
of  state in modern Russia is the necessity, whereby V. Putin is the “headquarters”
of  the entire regime. It can be concluded that despite the contradiction of  various
influential groups within the government, in the near future should not be
expected a major division within these structures. The rift is hypothetically
possible in the case of  substantial deterioration of  the economic situation, the
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drastic decline in public trust and support of  the current Putin regime, or in the
case of  consolidation of  Russian opposition forces and the significant growth in
their popularity, which at the present time, but not in the short term is not an
option. Harsh criticism of  Putin’s regime are aimed at “authoritarian and
bureaucratic nature of  government”; the fact that “often operate outside the
boundaries of  legality, public accountability and democratic principles”; a strong
presidential system of  governance “at the expense of  all other institutions”; on
state control of  the media; control of  the electoral process. Critics base their
allegation on the main feature of  Putin’s regime, i.e. the personality of  the
President. Summing up the views of  a large number of  Western and Russian
authors of  Putin’s popularity, it can be concluded that his success lies in the ability
to coordinate policy issues on which there is a broad national consensus in Russia.
In recent years a number of  sociological research was carried out on the support
of  Putin’s government and public opinion about the basic directions of  its
policies. The results of  these studies show that the level of  trust of  citizens for
the Russian President and his political concept is stable and around 60%. Instead
of  a general conclusion, we can only conclude that V. Putin successfully mastered
a practical lesson on leadership skills in concrete terms, forcing the concept of  a
state policy that at the polls in the country and the mood of  the nation had and
still has a mass support and popularity for more than a decade. Putin and
contemporary Russia have not still said their last words when it comes to Russia’s
domestic political scene and the international relations.
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VLADIMIR PUTIN I ANALIZA ULOGE LIČNOSTI LIDERA 
U FORMIRANJU I SPROVOĐENJU DRŽAVNE POLITIKE 
U SAVREMENOJ RUSIJI – 
OCENE I KRITIKE PUTINOVOG REŽIMA
Apstrakt: Nakon raspada sovjetske države Rusija se našla u sistemskoj krizi
koja je pretila da dezintegriše nekada moćnu državu. Politička i ekonomska
moć bila je u značajnoj meri izmeštena van institucija sistema, u ruke oligarha
i regionalnih gubernatora. Problemi u ekonomskoj, socijalnoj, demografskoj
i vojnoj sferi potresali su temelje ruske države. Na međunarodnoj sceni, uticaj
Rusije bio je marginalizovan. Svi elementi njene tvrde i meke moći, bili su
umanjeni. Rusija je izgubila atribute supersile i nekadašnja predvodnica
socijalističkog lagera svedena je na nivo regionalne sile. Dolaskom Vladimira
Putina na mesto predsednika RF 2000. godine, počela je nova faza u razvoju
postsovjetske Rusije. Pokrenute su opsežne unutrašnje političke, ekonomske
i socijalne reforme, kao i promene u spoljnoj i bezbednosnoj politici, što je
rezultiralo postepenim oporavkom i konsolidacijom ruske države i društva.
Jedna od suštinskih odlika političkog života Rusije jeste personalizacija vlasti,
odnosno institucije Predsednika RF, koja u velikoj meri zavisi od ličnosti
samog predsednika i njegovog najbližeg okruženja. Ova odlika ukorenjena
je u političkoj tradiciji i kulturi, odnosno u imperijalnom nasleđu. Pojedini
zapadni autori navode da je tradicija autokratskog vladanja u srži ruske
političke kulture, dok ruski autori smatraju da snažna centralna vlast, oličena
u instituciji predsednika države, u savremenoj Rusiji predstavlja nužnost u
početnoj fazi demokratizacije i tranzicije društva. Putin je od početka nastojao
da „ljude iz svog najbližeg okruženja „razlije“ u sve nivoe vlasti i sfere koje
generišu društvenu i političku moć“. Time se profilisala struktura Putinovog
režima u kojoj je veoma aktivan proces permanentne smene pozicija, uloga
i značaja pojedinih ličnosti, kao i njihovo „seljenje“ iz jedne sfere vlasti u
drugu. U celokupnom tom procesu fluktacije visoko-pozicioniranih
političara, svrstanih u uticajne grupe i klanove (tzv. siloviki, tehnokrate i
liberali), Putin ima ulogu „stožera“ celokupnog režima. Ocene o režimu
ruskog predsednika V. Putina, njegovoj ličnosti, kao i tragu koji je ostavio u
modernoj istoriji, polarizovanije su i kontroverznije nego ocene o mnogim
drugim ličnostima ruske, pa i globalne politike. Međutim, značaj koji Putin
ima za Rusiju i njenu poziciju i ulogu u XXI veku, nesporan je, kao što nisu
sporni ni njegov planetarni autoritet, ni njegova globalna popularnost. Putin
je jedan od najuticajnijih političara na svetu, ali su mišljenja autora u vezi sa
njim toliko podeljena, oprečna, suprotstavljena i „ideološki obojena“, da bi
svaki pokušaj njihove generalizacije predstavljao poduhvat unapred osuđen
na neuspeh. Amplitude reakcija kreću se od glorifikacije i divljenja, do
osporavanja i nipodaštavanja. Nesporno je da je reč o harizmatičnom,
pragmatičnom i sposobnom državniku, kao što je nesporna i činjenica da za
sprovođenje svoje politike ima natpolovičnu podršku ruskog naroda. Kritičari
Putinovog režima kao njegove osnovne odlike navode rigidnost vlasti,
nefleksibilnost, netransparentnost, birokratizovanost, dominaciju političko-
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ekonomskih elita, nestabilnost u smislu zasnovanosti na ličnosti predsednika,
a ne na balansu institucija. 
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